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Supreme Court of Jichgan.
DAVID MAYNARD

ET AL.

v. FRACTIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, &c.

A bequest to the members composing the School District Board by name, and
to their successors in officei of moneys to be expended in the purchase of books for
.a district library-they being the officers designated by law to perform similar
duties for the district-is in effect a bequest to the district.
A school district may receive a gift of money to be expended in books for a district library, at the unrestricted discretion of its officers, notwithstanding that by
statute the purchase of books for a district library, wfth district moneys, is subject
to various limitations. Such a general gift is not foreign to the purposes for
which districts exist, but in the direct line of furthering those purposes ; and
therefore the corporation may act as trustee in expending it under the general rules
which confine the action of corporations within the purposes of their creation.
Lucy M. MAYNARD by her last will directed the residue of her
estate, real and personal, not otherwise disposed of, to be sold and
converted into money and applied under the following provisions:
"The effects thereof I give to David A. Woodard, Ilanon Allen,
and Thomas Richards, District Board for Fractional School District
No. 1, in Milan, and No. 1 in York, and their successors for ever,
in trust for the following named purposes: .1 direct that the funds
so placed at the disposal of the said district board shall be placed
at interest by them, and the interest be annually used for purchasing and adding to a school library, the said library to be selected
and cared for by the said District Board or their legal representatives. And it is my wish that such books be selected as will be
suitable for people of all ages and classes within the said district,
and so used by them under proper rules and directions of said board
as shall best promote the interests of education, general literature
and morality."
The validity of this bequest was attacked by two of the heirs at
law. The Circuit Court of Wastenaw county, affirming the order
of the Probate Court, held the provisions to be valid; and the conclusions from the facts found were, "That the fair result of the bequest is to constitute the school district referred to, acting through
its district board, trustees; and that the residue now remaining in
the hands of the executors should be assigned to the persons constituting the district board of said school district and their successors
for ever, for the uses and purposes expressed in said will."
From this order two of the heirs, David and John Maynard,
appeal. ..
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-In order to determine the questions raised by the
appeal it is necessary to consider the legal position of school districts
and school boards.
Every school district is a corporation and the technical corporate
name of this district is, Fractional School District No. 1 in Milan
and No. 1 in York.
The district board have custody and care of all of the property
and moneys of the district (except such as may be confided under
certain circumstances to the director) and are required to apply
and pay over all school moneys belonging to the district in accordance with law. Where there are district libraries, these are under
the care and management of the district board, whose control is
general, and who make selections and purchases, and provide for
the safe-keeping and use of the books.
It is manifest, therefore, that both the intended beneficiary and
the managers are persons known to the law as competent to take
and use all property destined for the legitimate uses of school districts when sufficiently designated and granted.
The object of the will is entirely plain. It proposes to appropriate money to be used and managed permanently for the purposes
of a district school library. The books are to be selected by the
board for the time being, and the selection is with a view to promote
the interests of "education, general literature and morality."
The ordinance of 1789 under which this region was first set
apart for its future creation into states, which have been organized
under its sanctions, declared that religion, morality and knowledge
were necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
and provided that for these expressed purposes, " schools and the
means of education shall for ever be encouraged." It is somewhat
strange, therefore, to have it suggested that libraries are not within
the proper range of school apparatus, or that the purposes set forth
in this will are in conflict with public school purposes. When
schools cease to be used for such purposes they will cease to be
worthy of support or toleration. Nothing but poverty can make
it proper for any school district to deprive itself of the valuable aid
of libraries, which enlarge and supplement the work of the teachers,
and educate people of all ages as no other instrumentalities can
educate them. The bequest in controversy, if invalid, must be so
held because of some infirmity in the legal constitution of the district or in some defect in the declaration of the trust. .
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The bequest is for a purpose coming within the range of charities.
But it is not one which requires any consideration of the doctrines
which apply under the English system to imperfectly defined gifts
and trusts. The property and the trusts are definite, the beneficiary
is definite, and the trustees or managers are definite. If no managers were named, the administration of the trust would devolve on
those officers who manage district business, and the board designated
perform that function. The discretion involved, therefore, is the
discretion of the lawful administrators of the district, and is a corporate discretion. There is no room for technical criticism upon
the question whether the bequest is to the district or to the board.
The intention of the will is not obscure, and the testatrix has
directed the money to be paid just as she would have paid it in person had she desired during life to make a gift to the district.
There is really but one question of any importance- on the record.
That is, whether the corporation is legally capable of administering
such a trust, which the appellants claim is not within the statutory
powers; and they insist these bodies have none but statutory powers,
and cannot go beyond them.
Upon this point the diligence of counsel has collected much learning, but it seems to have been overlooked that the subject has
already been disposed of in this court, and we do not care to enlarge upon it.
In Stuart v. School Distriet No. 1 in Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69,
there was an examination into the powers of school districts to
enlarge and extend their course of instruction and it was held the
statutes cannot be narrowly construed without doing violence to
their intent. In Hathaway v. Sackett, 32 Mich. 97, the contest
was over a bequest to a village of fifteen thousand dollars to be used
in the erection of a building for a high school. The objection was
made there which is made here, that the purpose was foreign to the
objects of the corporation. It was held, however, not to be repugnant, on the ground that education was a recognised factor in all
civilization, and that schools were as important instruments of public advancement as municipal institutions, and neither foreign nor
incongruous elements in municipal affairs.
Whether school districts could, without statutory authority, raise
money for any library not meant for the purposes of the schools, is a
very different question from whether adistrict library, if obtained without taxation, would be foreign to the educational interests of the
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district. We are not disposed to regard the present library law as
having any especial bearing on this matter. The argument which
in the absence of such a law would exclude a library, would possibly stand in the way of keeping up any library not in all things
patterned after the statute and supported in the same way, But
we have no hesitation in holding, in accordance with the previous
decisions, that there is nothing in our laws which cuts off public
corporations from accepting benevolent offerings to enable them to
extend their usefulness, and benefit their people, by enlarging their
opportunities for culture and refinement, without multiplying or
increasing their burdens. We do not hold that they may not reject such gifts if they have not intelligence enough to appreciate
them. But we think the acceptance of such a bequest as this by a
school district is in the direct line of corporate authority.
The judgment of the court below must be affirmed with costs
of both courts, and the order be remitted for further proceedings.
All the judges concurred.
The objection to the bequest in the
principal case was not ased upon any
inability on the part of the district
authorities to establish and maintain a
district library, for that authority was
fully conferred by the statute, which
authorized the township to vote moneys
for district libraries for the use of residents of the district, and empowered
the district board to expend them. But
the statute also required that the books
should be unsectarian in character and
suitable for a district library. The
power of the board was therefore care.
fully limited and confined within definite
bounds. If now the board could be
empowered by a private donor to purchase books in its discretion, it was said
that books sectarian in character might
be procured, and books not suitable for
a district library, and thus the library be
made up of books not sanctioned by
law, but virtually prohibited, and the
whole character of the library contemplated by law be changed. The
trust would consequently, it was argued,
be for a purpose not contemplated in
the corporate organization, and any
VOL. XXV.-42

action in furtherance of it would be
ultra vires.
It will appear from the opinion that
the court did not deem it necessary to
give much attention to this objection,
considering it covered by the previous
decisions, especially that of Hatkaway
v. Suckett, 32 Mich. 97, in which an incorporated village was held competent
to take a bequest for the establishment
of a high school. In explanation of
that decision it should be stated that
village corporations under the statute
of Michigan do not establish schools;
that power being conferred upon school
districts, which are independent corporations, and the boundaries of which in a
village may or may not be identical
with those of the village itself. The
court held in that cdse that the village
had power to accept the bequest, and
that if further powers were needed to
enable the trust to be executed they
might be conferred afterwards. A somewhat similar ease is that of FirstParik
in Sutton v. Cole, 3 Pick. 232, in which
there was a devise of lands to a parish
"to be applied to the use of schools,
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and to be kept by the inhabitants for
ever." Tojvns, and not parishes, are
the proper organizations in Massachusets for the creation of schools at
the expense of their corporators, and
they are compelled under penalty to
establish and support them. And the
objection was there made that "parishes
are corporations with limited powers,
relating only to parochial objects, such
as providing for public worsh1P, and
having no authority to hold property for
themselves or other persons to any
other trust or purpose ; at least not for
schools, which is not a duty required of
them by law." But it appeared that
by statute parishes were permitted to
raise money for the support of schools
for their children, and the objection was
therefore held unsound, though it is
inferrible from what is said that it would
have been overruled had no such statute
existed. In PhillipsAcademy v. King,
12 Mass. 546, a question arose that may
be compared to the question made by
the appellants in the principal case,
upon the discretionary authority conferred upon the school board by the
bequest in the selection of books. In
that case a bequest was made to an
academy established with the design of
propagating "Calvinism as containing
the important principles and distinguishing tenets of our holy Christian religion,
as summarily expressed in the Westminster Assembly's shorter catechism ;"
and the bequest which was contested
proposed to add to this "the distinguishing principles of Hopkinsianism, a union
or mixture inconsistent with the original
design." But the court put aside the
objection as unfounded, holding that
the original design was the propagation
of the Christian religion, and the bequest was in furtherance of that design
and in nothing inconsistent with it.
The case of rirst Congregational Sciety of Stonington v. Atwater, 23 Conn.
34, was one in which a bequest to a
corporation required action which in

one particular went clearly beyond the
contemplation of the law in its foundation. It was a gift to a school society
of a town for the establishment and
support of schools, but it required the
trustees to be selected from two named
religious organizations. In this regard
it was quite as objectionable as was the
conferring of general powers upon the
school board to purchase books where
the statute had only given restricted
powers ; but the gift was supported.
In Sargent v. Cornish, 54 N. H. 19, it
is decided that a municipal corporation
may receive and hold money in trust
for an object not foreign to its general
purposes, even though the statute had
withheld from it the powers to raise
money by taxation for the same object.
The gift there was to a town for the
purpose of a yearly display of United
States flags, and it was sustained. In
The Dublin Case, 38 N. H. 459, a gift
to a town for religious purposes was
sustained, though towns had theii lost
their powe' to make contracts and raise
taxes for those purposes. These cases
cover the general subject. It is conceded that corporations cannot be trustees for purposes not germane to the
purposes for which they are created:
Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Jolmns. 422;
Trustees, &c., v. Peasly, 15 X. H. 317;
Perryon Trusts, sects. 42, 43, and cases
cited ; but where the purposes are germane they maybe such trustees: Philadeiphia v. Fox, 6:4 Penna. St. 169 ;
Webb v. Neal, 5 Allen 575 ; Heuser v.
Harris,42 Ill. 425 ; Vidal v. Girard's
Executors, 2 How. 61 ; McDonough's
.Executors v. Miurdocc, 15 How. 367.
Even though other purposes are added
which are not germane: Matter of
Howe, I Paige 214. And we take it
that when the law forbids public moneys
to be expended in the purchase of
sectarian hooks for district libraries, it
does not thereby condemn them, or
declare them foreign to the purposes of
such libraries. The object in the re-
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.. rictiozn is merely to prevent an aha.te;
bit if every religious denomination were
inclined to make presents of its books
to any public corporation connected
with public instruction, it would be extra'irdinary if the corporation should be
fiound lacking in authority to receive
thetn. There is no policy of the law
that would exclude from any public
library any book which is not vicious
and immoral in ain or tendency.
Another point not touched upon in
the principal case is of interest, namely :
Conceding that the authority of the corporation to execute the trust is doubtful,

can the heirs raise the question ? It
has been decided that if the trust is
valid in itself, as this clearly was, being
a charity, only the state and not tie
heirs or-other private parties could inquire into or contest the right of the
corporation as trustee : T ade v. Colouizatwn Society, 15 Bliss. 663. And
see Vidal v. Girard'sExecutors, 2 How.
61, 191 ; Kinnaird v. Miller, 25 Grat.
107 ;
irst Cingregatibnal Scity v.
Atwater, 23 Conn. 34 ; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539 ; Hathaway v. Stckett,
32 lich. 97.
T. M. C.

Supreme Court of Bhode Iland.
CHARLES V. LYNCII v. JOHN FALLON..
A broker employed by A. to negotiate an exchange of properties between him
and B., cannot recover commissions of B., although after the exchange was effected
he expressly promised to pay.

&SSUMPSIT heard by the court, jury trial being waived.
ifenry B. Whitman, for plaintiff.
B. N. ,. S. S. Lapham, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DURFiEE, C. J.-This is an action of assumpsit to recover $2500
for commissions for the plaintiff's services as a broker in negotiating
tin exchange of real estate. The two estates exchanged were a
hotel estate, belonging to tle defendant, situated in Worcester, and
valued by tile defendant at $125,000, on one side, and a tract of
land belonging to the West Elmwood Land Company, situated in
Providence, on the other side. There was, subject to mortgages,
an even exchange. The plaintiff claims that the defendant made
him an express promise to pay him the regular commissions before
the exchange, and after the exchange promised to pay him $2500.
The defendant denies this. We think the agreement is proved.
The defendant contends that, if proved, it is not binding upon him,
the plaintiff having been previously employed by the West Ehwood
Land Company to sell their land, and being in their employ throughout the transaction. We think this is proved. The plaintiff has
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in fact presented a bill to the company or its representatives for
services in effecting the exchange.
The general rule is, that though a person may be entitled to pay
from both parties to a sale or exchange where he acts merely as a
middleman to bring them together (Rupp v. Sampson, 16 Gray
398 ; Siegel v. Gould, 7 Lans. 177), he cannot be allowed to serve
as an agent or broker for both, because in such case there is a
necessary conflict between his interest and duty, and he is exposed
to a temptation to sacrifice the interests of one or both of his principals to secure his double commissions. As agent for the vendor,
his duty is to sell at the highest price; as agent for the vendee, his
duty is to buy for the lowest; and even if the parties bargain for
themselves, they are entitled to the benefit of the skill, knowledge,
and advice of the agent, and, at the same time, to communicate with
him without the slightest fear of betrayal, so that it is hardly possible for him to be true to the one without being false to the other.
The claim to charge commissions to both parties is so unreasonable
that it cannot be justified by any custom or usage: -Farnsworthv.
Ifemmer, 1 Allen 494; Walker v. Osgood, 98 Mass. 348 ; Pugsley
v. Murray, 4 E. D. Smith 245; _Everhart v. Searle, 71 Penn. St.
256; Ra iin v. Clark, 41 Md. 158; Bchwartze v. Yearly, 31 Md.
270; Morison v. Thompson, Law Rep. 9 Q. B. 480.
It is intimated in Pugsley v. Murray, 4 E. D. Smith 245, that
the rule only applies where the broker conceals the double employment; but other cases rest the invalidity of the contract upon
broad grounds of public policy, and hold that it cannot be enforced
even against a party who, knowing that the broker is already employed, promises expressly to pay him for his services. Thus in
Everhartv. Searle, 71 Penna. St. 256, the defendant, knowing the
plaintiff had the property for sale, agreed to pay him $500 for
assisting him to negotiate a purchase of it, and it was held that the
plaintiff could not recover on the contract. "The transaction,"
say the court, "is to be regarded as against the policy of the law,
and not binding upon a party who has a right to object to it."
In Raisin v. Clark, 41 Md. 158, it was held that the broker
could not recover of the party who last employed him, even though
the double employment was known to both parties, and the party
-who first employed him had paid his commission. The court say:
" The rule forbids the court to entertain an action founded upon
such a contract." * * * "It is perhaps possible for the same agent
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to serve both parties to such a transaction honestly and faithfully,
but it is very difficult to do so, and the temptation to do otherwise
is so strong that the law has wisely interposed a positive prohibition
to any such attempt." And see Story on Agency, §§ 210, 211.
In the case at bar we do not find that the West Elmwood Land
Company was inforned by the plaintiff of his employment by the
defendant. •The representatives of the company continued to confer
freely with him, and raised the price of their land, which they held
at $50,000, and which they had previously offered through the
plaintiff at fifteen cents a foot, to twenty-five cents a foot, so as to
bring it up to or near the price which the defendant had put upon
his estate. The plaintiff, for anything that appears, co-operated in
this; he says he told the defendant it was a nice piece of land,
good to build on; he does not say he ever told the defendant that
the price was enormously inflated. The case shows how easy it is
for an agent of both parties to become, either consciously or unconsciously, a mere instrument in the hands of the more adroit and
sharp-witted.party in hoodwinking the other and decoying him into
a disadvantageous bargain. It indicates what temptations and
facilities such a double agency presents for unconscionable concealments and misrepresentations, and how dangerous it would be even
if it were exercised with the consent of both parties; and certainly
without such consent, freely and fully given, the law ought not to
tolerate it for a moment.
We give the defendant judgment for his costs.
That no man can serve two masters
is as well established in the common
law as in any higher code.
Accordingly, one who undertakes
it is not allowed to recover compensation from both parties for whom
he was acting. This is clear. By
engaging to serve the second he forfeits his right to recover compensation from the one who first employed
him; for he has placed himself in a
position where he is unable to give his
first employer all te skill, knowledge,
discretion and experience which by his
contract of agency he was bound to
furnish: Wfalker v. Osgod, 98 Mass.
348. Not only so, but he acquires no
right to compensation from his second

employer, although the latter knew
when he engaged him that he was already
under a prior contract with the first
principal. So far as he is concerned,
it might be thought that if he knew the
agent was already in the employ of,
and interested for the opposite party,
and chose to confide in him, notwithstanding his adverse interests, he ought
not subsequently to refuse to pay him
the compensation stipulated on his part,
especially if there has been no actual
fraud or deception on the part of such
double agent. But it should be remembered that such arrangements are
not illegal because of actual fraud in
the particular case, but because all contracts which are opposed to opt', up-
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right and fair dealing are contrary to
public policy and void. Any contract.
therefore, by which one is placed under
a direct inducement to violate the con.
fidence reposed in him by another, is of
this character. It is the duty of an
agent of a seller to get the highest
price that can be obtained in market,
and if he subsequently engage with an
expected purchaser to receive a commission from him on the purchase, he
is under an inducement to effect a sale
to him on lower terms than might have
been obtained from others, because
thereby he would secure a commission
from both parties. He is thus placed
under a direct temptation to deal unjustly with the first principal. If such
an arrangement can ever be valid, therefore, it can be only when the double
agency is known and approved by both
principals. See Price v. Wood, 113
Mass. 133.
And so careful is the law to protect
parties from imposition that if a person
engages his friend and confidential adviser to examine property which he contemplates purchasing, and give his
opinion upon it gratuitously,and he does
so, and thus a sale is effected, such
.friend and adviser cannot afterwards
recover of the vendor for accomplishing
such sale, although he has expressly
agreed to pay him. Contracts to pay
"poundage for recommending customers
to buy" are odious in the law : Bollman v. Loomis, 41 Conn. 581 (1874);
W[jburd v. Stanton, 4 Esp. 179.
- Not only is an agent debarred from
recovering commissions from such second
principal, but any-arrangement he may
make with him in consideration of such
a double agency cannot he enforced.
Therefore, if an agent empowered to
sell agrees with an expected buyer to
introduce him to the vendor and aid in
promoting the sale, if the buyer will
subsequently sell him part of the property at an agreed price, such agree-

meat is invalid, and cannot be enforced
by the agent against the buyer after he
has purchased the whole estate : Smitht
v. 2wnosend, 109 Mass. 500.
So obnoxious to the law is this specieg
of double dealing that not even a usage
among brokers to charge double commissions in such cases will be of any
avail. A custom or usake-to be legal
and valid must be reasonable and consistent with good morals and sound
policy, so that parties may be supposed
to have made their contracts with reference to it. If a -valid usage is shown
to exist it then becomes the law hy
which the rights of the parties are to he
regulated and governed. But a usage
to charge double commissions is wanting
in these essential elements. It would
be unreasonable, because, if established,
it would operate to prevent the faithful
fulfilment of the contract of agency.
It would be contrary to good morals
and sound .policy, because it tends to
sanction an unwarrantable concealment
of facts essential to a contract, and
operates as a fraud on parties who had
a right to rely on the confidence reposed in their agents : Trnsworth v.
Hemmer, 1 Allen 494; Raisin v. Clark,
41 Md. 158.
It is intimated in the case of Lynch v.
Fallon, that a person could not act as
agent for both parties, even though
such double agency were known and
assented to at the time by both parties,
and both agree that each shall pay a
portion of the fees. But this may be
questionable when everything is fair and
and understood by all parties. SeeJoslin
v. Cowee, 56 N. Y. 626 (1874) ; Rowe v.
Stevens, 53 N. Y. 621, affirming same
case in 3 Jones & Sp. 189 ; Adams Alining Co. v. Senter, 26 Mich. 73; F tzsinzmeons v. Southern Expres Co., 40 Geo.
330. An agent to purchase cannot,
ordinarily, buy of himself (as is well
known), and ivice versa; but if such a
transaction is fully assented to after-

DOYTE v. CONTINENTAL INS. CO.
wards by the principal, no doubt it may
be done, and thus he will ratilt the sale;
and a./', lori,if it was expressly assented
to before the same was undertaken to be
done by the agent.
But without any assent or ratification
by the principal, not only is the principal
not liable to the agentforhis commission,
but he may avoid the contract as against
the other party, although he may be as innocent as himself. The medium through
which they have been bi-ought together
is tainted, and each party may repudiate
the transaction if he does so in di
time. See Fish v. Le-onr, 69 Ill. 394;
Panaina Telegraph Co. v. India Rubber,
!kc., Co., Law Rep., 10 Ch. App. 515
(1875), a very important case on this
subject.

And even if the principal has ratified
the contract made by a double agent,
so far as the adverse party is concerned,
it does not necessarily follow that he is
liable to the fraudulent agent for his
commissions. They stand on different
grounds : Solomon v. Peandor, 3 Hurlst.
& C. 639 (1865), where an agent to sell
the defendant's land sold it to a company in which he was himself interested
as a shareholder; and it was held that
although the defendant had concluded
to abide by the sale, he was notwithstanding not liable to the agent for his
commissions. See the general subject
treated in a masterly manner in the
notes to For v. Macreth, I Lead. Ca.
in Equity 115.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.

Supreme Court of the United States.
PETER DOYLE, SECRPTAr or STATE or WIscoNstN, v. THE CONTINENTAL INS. CO. OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.
The decision in Home Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wallace 445, reaffirmed that
an agreement to abstain in all cases from resorting to the courts of the United
States is void as against public policy, and that a statute of the state of Wisconsin
requiring such an agreement is in conflict with the Constitution of the United
States, and void.
A state has the right to impose conditions to the transaction of business within
its territory by an insurance company chartered by another state, which are not in
conflict with the constitution or laws of the United States.
It has the right entirely to exclude such corporation from its territory, or having
given a license, to revoke it, in its discretion, for good cause, or without cause.
The motive or intention of the state in so doing is not open to inquiry. The
company has no constitutional right to transact its business in such state, and
hence its exclusion therefrom for whatever cause violates no constitutional right.
The legislature of the state of Wisconsin enacted that if any foreign insurance
company should transfer a suit brought against it from the %tate courts to the
federal courts, it should thereupon become the duty of the secretary of the state
of Wisconsin to revoke and cancel its license to do business within the state. An
injunction to restrain the secretary of state from so doing because such transfer is
made cannot be sustained. Having no constitutional right to do business in that
state, the suggestion that the intent of the legislature is to accomplish an illegal
result, to wit, the prevention of a resort to the federal courts, is immaterial.
The right of exclusion belongs to the state, and the means by which it accomplislies that result are not the subject of judicial inquiry.
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THIS was a bill of complaint, alleging that the complainant, The
Continental Insurance Company of the city of New York, was a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of
Connecticut and a citizen of that state; that prior to the passage
of the act of the legislature of the state of Wisconsin, entitled "An
act to provide for the incorporation and government of fire and
inland navigation insurance companies," approved March 4th 1870,
the complainant had established agencies, opened offices, and mrade
considerable expenditures of money in advertising the business of
insurance against loss by fire in the state of Wisconsin; that soon
after the passage of said act complainant complied with the provision of section 22 thereof, and procured from the state treasurer
and secretary of state the certificates and license to do business in
said state as therein provided, and did subsequently fully comply
with said act; but that upon filing appointment of an agent upon
whom process of law could be served, complainant was compelled to
add an agreement, on its part, not to remove into the federal courts
suits brought against it in the state courts, which agreement to
that effect was made; that after the decision of this court in The
Home Insurance Company v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, the complainant
removed a suit brought on one of its policies against it in the state
court, into the federal court; that because of such removal a demand
was made upon the defendant, Peter Doyle, as secretary of state,
that he revoke the certificate or license authorizing the complainant
to do business in said state of Wisconsin; that complainant had a
large number of agencies in the state engaged in the conduct of its
business, and a revocation of its license would work great and
irreparable injury to the complainant in its business in said state,
and the complainant feared that said defendant would revoke said
license unless restrained by injunction. A temporary injunction
was issued restraining the defendant from revoking the license of
the complainant because of the removal of said suit from the state
to the federal court.
The defendant demurred to the bill. The demurrer was overruled,
and a decree entered making the injunction perpetual. From this
decree the defendant appealed.
Section 22, chapter 56, Laws of Wisconsin, 1870, provides as
follows: "That any fire insurance company, association or partnership, incorporated by or organized under the laws of any other
state of the United States, desiring to transact any such business
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as aforesaid, by any agent or agents, in this state, shall first appoint an attorney in this state, on whom process of law can be
served, containing an agreement that such company will not remove
the suit for trial in the United States Circuit or federal courts, and
file in the office of the secretary of state a written instrument, duly
sigictd and sealed, certifying such appointment, which shall contiltue until another attorney be substituted."
Sects. 1 and 3,chap. 64, Laws of Wisconsin of 1872, provide as
follows: "Sect. 1. If any insurance company or association shall
make applicatioh to change the venue or remove any suit or action
heretofore commenced, or which shall be hereafter commenced, in
any court of the state of Wisconsin, to the United States Circuit or
District Court, or to the federal court, contrary to the provisions
of any law of the state of Wisconsin, or contrary to any-agreement
it has made and filed, or may make and file, as provided and required
by section 22 of chapter 56 of the general laws of Wisconsin for the
year A. D. 1870, or any provision of law now in force in said state, or
which may hereafter be enacted therein, it shall be the imperative duty
of the secretary of state, or other proper state officer, to revoke and
recall any authority or license to such company to do and transact
any business in the state of Wisconsin, and no renewal or new license
or certificate shall be granted to such company for three years after
such revocation, and such company shall therefore (thereafter) be
-prohibited from transacting any business in the state of Wisconsin
until again duly licensed."
"Section 3. If any insurance company or association shall make
application to remove any case from the state court into the United
States Circuit or District Court, or federal court, contrary to the
provisions of chapter 56 of the general laws of Wisconsin for the
year A. D. 1870, or any other state law, or contrary to any agreement which such company may have filed in pursuance of said
chapter 56 of the general laws of Wisconsin for the year A. D. 1870,
or any other law of the state of Wisconsin, it shall be liable, in
addition to a penalty of not less than $100 or more than $500, for
each application so made, or for each offence so committed for
making such application, the same to be recovered by suit in the
name of the state of Wisconsin ; and it shall be the imperative duty
of the attorney-general of the state of Wisconsin to see and attend
that all of the provisions of said chapter 56 of the general laws of
1870, and the provisions of this act, are duly enforced."
VOL. XXV.-43
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George B. Smith and A. Scott S/loan, for appellants.

TWm. Allen Butler, B. T. Stevens and J. .Sloan, for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HUNT,

J.-The case of the Home Insurance aomvany v. Xorse,

reported in 20 Wall. 445, is the basis of the bill of complaint in the
present suit. We have carefully reviewed our decision in that case
and are satisfied with it. In that case, an agreement not to remove
any suit brought against it in the state courts of Wisconsin, into the
federal courts, had been made by the company in compliance with
the Wisconsin statute of 1870. The company nevertheless did
take all the steps required by the United States statute of 1789,
to remove its suit with Morse from the state court into the federal
courts. Disregarding that action, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
allowed the action in the state court to proceed to judgment against
the company as if no transfer had been made. When the judgment
thus obtained was brought into this court, we held it to be illegally
obtained, and reversed it. It was held, first, upon. the general
principles of law, that although an individual may lawfully omit to
exercise his right to transfer a particular case from the state courts
to the federal courts, and may do this as often as he thinks fit in
each recurring case, he cannot bind himself in advance by any agreement which may be specifically enforced thus to forfeit his rights.
This was upon the principle that every man is entitled to resort to.
all the courts of the country, to invoke the protection which all the
laws and all the courts may afford him, and that he cannot barter
away his life, his freedom or his constitutional rights.
As to the effect of the statutory requirement of the agreement,
the opinion, at page 458 of the case as reported, is in these words:
"On this bran~h of the case the conclusion is this: I 1st. The Constitution of the United States secures to citizens of another state
than that in which suit is brought an absolute right to remove their
cases into the federal court upon compliance with the terms of the
Act of 1789. 2d. The statute of Wisconsin is an obstruction to
this right, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and
the laws in pursuance thereof, and is illegal and void. 3d. The
agreement of the insurance company derives no support fromt an
unconstitutional statute, and is void, as it would be had no such
statute been passed.'"
The opinion of a court must always be read in connection with the
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facts upon which it is based. Thus, the second conclusion above
recited, that the statute of Wisconsin is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and is illegal and void, must be understood
as spoken of the provision of the statute under review, to wit, that
portion thereof requiring a stipulation not to transfer causes to the
courts of the United States. The decision was upon that portion
of the statute only, and other portions thereof, when they arc presented, must be judged of upon their merits. We have not decided that the state of Wisconsin had not the
power to impose terms and conditions as preliminary to the right
of an insurance company to appoint agents, keep offices and issue
policies in that state. On the contrary, the case of Paul v. Yir.
ginia, 8 Wall. 168, where it is held that such conditions may be
imposed, was cited with approval in Home Insurance Co. v. .lIorse.
That case arose upon a statute of Virginia, providing that no, foreign insurance company should transact business within that state
until it had taken out a license and made a deposit with the state
treasurer of bonds varying in amount from $30,000 to 850,000,
according to the amount of its capital. This court sustained the
power of the legislature to impose such conditions, and sustained
the judgment of the state court convicting Paul upon an indictment
for violating the state law in issuing policies without having first
complied with the conditions required.
-Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410, decides that the statute of
the state of Illinois requiring a license to be taken out by foreign
insurance companies, for which six dollars each should be paid, and
the filing of an appointment of an attorney with power to accept
service of process, was a legal condition; and a requirement that
when such company was located in the city of Chicago, it should
also pay to the tieasurer of that city $2 upon the $1000 upon
the amount of all premiums received, was held to be legal. In
the La Fayette _msurance Co. v. French, 18 How.. 404, the court
say "a corporation created by Indiana can transactbusiness in Ohio
only with the consent, express or implied, of the latter state: 13
Peters 519. This consent may be accompanied by such conditions
as Ohlo may think fit to impose; and these conditions must be
deemed valid and effectual by other states and by this court, provided they are not repugnant to the constitution or laws of the
United States, or inconsistent with those rules of public law which
secure the jurisdiction and authority of each state -from encroach-
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ment by all others, or that principle of natural justice which forbids
condemnation without opportunity for defence."
Neither did the case of the Romne -InsuranceCompany, mipra,
undertake to decide what are the powers of the state of Wisconsin, in
revoking a license previously granted to an insurance company, for
what causes or upon what grounds its action in that respect may be
based. No such question arose upon the facts or was argued by
counsel or referred to in the opinion of the court.
The case now before us does present that point, and with distinctness. The complainant alleges that a license had been granted
to the Continental Insurance Company upon it executing an agreement that it would not remove any suit against it from the tribunal
of the state to the federal courts; that in the case of Drake it did,
on the 10th day of March 1875, transfer his suit from the Winnebago Circuit of the state to the Circuit Court of the United States;
that Drake thereupon demanded that the defendant, who is secretary of state of Wisconsin, should revoke and annul its license, in
accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1872 ; that it is insisted that he has power to do so summarily, without notice or trial;
that the complainant is fearful that he will do so, and that it will
be done simply and only for the reason that the complainant transferred to the federal court the case of Drake, as above set forth.
The cases of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; -Ducatv.
Chicago, 10 Wall. 410 ; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Id. 168, and La
.Fayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, established the principle that a state may impose upon a foreign corporation, as a
condition of coming into or doing business within its territory, any
terms, conditions and restrictions it may think proper that are not
repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United States. The
point is elaborated at great length by Chief Justice TAiEY in the
case first named, and by Mr. Justice CURTIS in the case last named.
The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a.necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by a state is
always revocable: Rector v. Philadephia,24 How. 800 ; People
v. Roper, 55 N. Y. 629; People v. Commissioners, 47 Id. 50.
The power to revoke can only be restrained, if at all, by an explicit contract upon good consideration to that effect: Hfunphrey v.
Pegues, 16 Wall. 244; Tomlinson v. Je8sup, 16 Id. 454.
A license to a foreign corporation to enter a state does not involve a permanent right to remain. Full power and control over
its territories, its citizens and its business (subject to the laws and
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constitution of the United States) belong to the state. If the state
has the power to do an act its intention or the reason by which it
is influenced in doing it cannot be inquired into. Thus the pleading before us alleges that the permission of .the Continental Insurance Company to transact its business in Wisconsin is about to be
revoked for the reason that it removed the case of Drake from the
state to the federal courts. If the act of an individual is within
the terms of the law, whatever may be the reason which governs
him, or whatever may be the result, it cannot be impeached. The
acts of a state are subject to still less inquiry, either as to the act
itself or as to the reason for it. The state of Wisconsin (except so
far as its connection with the constitution and laws of the United
States alters its position) is a sovereign state, possessing all the
powers of the most absolute government in the world.
The argument that the revocation in question is made for an
unconstitutional reason cannot be sustained. The suggestion confounds an act with an emotion or a mental proceeding, which is not
the subject of inquiry in determining the validity of a statute. An
unconstitutional reason or intention is an impractical suggestion
which cannot be applied to the affairs of life. If the act done by
the state is legal, is not in violation of the constitution or laws of
the United States, it is quite out of the power of any court to inquire what was the intention of those who enacted the law.
In all the cases where the litigation of a state has been declared
void, such legislation has been based upon an act or a fact which
was itself illegal. Thus in randallv. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, a tax
was imposed and collected upon passengers in railroad and stage
companies. In Alny v. State of California,24 How. 169, a stamp
duty was imposed by the legislature upon bills of lading for gold
or silver transported from that state to any port or place out of
the state. In Brown v. The State of Mfaryland, 12 Wheat.
419, a license, at an expense of $50, was required before an importer of goods could sell the same by the bale, package or barrel. In Henderson v. The Mayor of New York, 2 Otto 265, the
statute required the master to give a bond of $300 for each passenger, conditioned that he should not become a public charge
within four years, or to pay the sum of $1.50. In the Passengers'
Case, 7 How. 572, the requirement was of a like character.
In all these cases it was the act or fact complained of that was
the subject of judicial inquiry, and upon the act was the judgment
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pronounced. The statute of Wisconsin declares that if a foreign
insurance company shall remove any case from its state court into
the federal courts, contrary to the provisions of the Act of 1870, it
shall be the duty of the secretary of state immediately to cancel its
license to do business within the state. If the state has the power
to cancel the license, it has the power to judge of the cases in which
the cancellation shall be made. It has the power to determine for
what causes and in what manner the revocation shall be made.
It is said that we thus indirectly sanction what we condemn when
presented directly, to wit, that we enable the state of Wisconsin
to enforce an agreement to abstain from the federal courts. This is
an "inexact statement." The effect of our decision in this respect
is that the state may compel the foreign company to abstain from
the federal courts, or cease to do business in the state. It gives the
company the option. This is justifiable, because the complainant
has no constitutional right to do business in that state; that state
has authority at any time to declare that it shall not transact business there. This is the whole point of the case, and without reference to the injustice, the prejudice or the wrong that is alleged to
exist, must determine the question. No right of the complainant
under the laws or constitution of the United States, by its exclusion
from the state, is infringed, and this is what the state now accomplishes. There is nothing, therefore, that will justify the interference of this court. The decree of the court below awarding a.
perpetual injunction is reversed, and the cause is remanded that a.
decree be entered dismissing the bill for want of equity.
BRADLEY, J., dissenting.-I feel obliged to dissent from the
judgment of the court in this case. The following is a brief statement of the reasons for my opinion :Though a state may have the power (if it sees fit to subject its
citizens to the inconvenience) of prohibiting all foreign corporations
from transacting business within its jurisdiction, it has no power to
impose unconstitutional conditions upon their doing so. Total
prohibition may produce suffering, and may manifest a spirit of
unfriendliness toward sister states, but prohibition except upon
conditions derogatory to the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the
United States, is mischievous and productive of hostility and disloyalty to the general government. If a state is unwise enough to
legislate the one, it has no constitutional power to legislate the other.
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The citizens of the United States, whether as individuals or associations, corporate or incorporate, have a constitutional right, in
proper cases, to resort to the courts of the United States.

Any

agreement, stipulation or state law precluding them from this right
is absolutely void-just as void as would be an agreement not to
resort to the state courts for redress of wrongs, or defence of unjust
actions, or as would be a city ordinance prohibiting an appeal to
the state courts from municipal prosecutions.
The questions arising upon these Wisconsin laws have already
been considered by this court in the case of the Home Insurance
Co. v.

Hore,

and we held and adjudged that the agreement which

the company was compelled to make, not to remove a suit into the
federal courts, was absolutely void. In principle, this case does not
differ a particle from that. The state legislation of 1872, under
which, and in obedience to which, the license of the appellees is
threatened to be revoked, is just as unconstitutional and just as void
as the agreement was in the former case.
The argument used, that the greater always includes the less,
and therefore, if the state may exclude the appellees without any
cause, it may exclude them for a bad cause, is not sound. It is
just as unsound as it would be for me to say that, because I may without cause refuse to receive a man as my tenant, therefore I may make
it a condition of his tenancy that he shall take the life of my enemy,
or rob my neighbor of his property.
The conditions of society and the modes of doing business in this
country are such that a large part of its. transactions is conducted
through the agency of corporations. This is especially true with
regard to the business of banking, insurance and transportation.
Individuals cannot safely engage in enterprises of this sort, requiring
large capital. They can only be successfully carried out by corporations in which individuals may safely join their small contributions
without endangering their entire fortunes. To shut these institu-.
tions out of neighboring states would not only cripple-their energies,
but would deprive the people of those states of the benefits of their
enterprise. The business of insurance, particularly, can only be
carried on with entire safety by scattering the risks over large areas
of territory, so as to secure the benefits of the most extended average.
The needs of the country require that corporations-at least those
of a commercial or financial character--should be able to transact
business in different states. If these states can at will deprive them
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of the right to resort to the courts of the United States, then in
large portions of the country the government and laws of the United
States may be nullified and rendered inoperative with regard to a
large class of transactions constitutionally belonging to their jurisdiction.
The whole thing, however free from intentional disloyalty, is
derogatory to that mutual comity and respect which ought to prevail
between the state and general governments, and ought to meet the
condemnation of the courts, whenever brought within their proper
cognisance.
In my judgment, the decree for injunction ought to be affirmed;
and in this opinion I am authorized to say that Justices SWAYNE
and MILLER concur.

Court of Appeals of Kentuchy.
OWENSBORO SAVINGS BANK v. WESTERN BANK.
Ratification by a principal of his agent's acts is only binding when made on
full knowledge of the facts as they actually exist, not merely as the agent supposes them to exist.
The good faith of the agent does not exonerate him from liability to his principal if he has been in fact negligent or has disregarded orders.
Plaintiff, a bank, authorized its agent to make a loan on a note with any good collateral security. The agent made a loan on what would have been good security had
it been free from prior liens, but the existence of prior liens was claimed. The
plaintiff, with knowledge of this claim, accepted the note and the collaterals and
brought suit to enforce its demand against the holder of the collaterals. In this
suit it was defeated, the priority of the holder's lien being established. The plaintiff then brought suit against its agent for negligence in making the loan without
good security: field, that it had not ratified the agent's act, and on proof of the
negligence it was entitled to recover.
' Where an agent to loan money takes insufficient security the principal is not
bound at his peril to accept it and discharge the agent or to reject it and look only
to the responsibility of the agent; he may take the security and still hold the
agent for any deficiency which, afier due diligence, he suffers on it.

from Jefferson. The appellant (who was plaintiff below)
and appellee were both incorporated state banks, doing a general banking business, the former in Owensboro and the latter in Louisville.
July 17th 1872, the appellant had money on deposit with the
appellee, and on that day, by its cashier, W. K. Anderson, wrote
to Henry Hurter, appellee's cashier, as follows:"We would like to have you invest some means for us, if you
can, in good paper, at 30, 60, 90 or 120 days' time."
ERROR
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July 24th 1872, Hurter, in a letter signed "Henry Hurter,
cashier," wrote to appellant's cashier that he had, on that day,
loaned for appellant, to Robert Atwood, $5000 on his note at ninety
days, secured by seventy shares of Bank of Louisville stock, certificates for which, endorsed by Atwood, he then held and would forward to appellant if desired. In the afternoon of the same day
Hurter wrote a second letter, in which he said: ,"I omitted to inquire in my letter of this morning whether you wish the collaterals
transferred on the books of the Bank of Louisville to your name,
and certificates issued." In reply to the first of these letters, appellant wrote, acknowledging the receipt of Atwood's note, and
returning it for collection, and also that the investment was entirely
satisfactory ; and in reply to the second, "We do not care to handle
at all the collaterals on any paper you may discount for us. Do
by them as you would if yours."
About August 15th, Atwood failed, and Hurter wrote to the appellant as follows: " At the time I loaned Mr. Atwood $5000 of
your funds on Bank of Louisville stock as collateral security, I
Vent to the Bank of Louisville, and ascertained from Mr. Morgan,
the cashier, that the bank held no lien upon that stock, and informed Morgan, as there was no encumbrance on the stock, I would
make a loan thereon. Yesterday it was rumored on the street that
Mr. Atwood had failed, and I went to the Bank of Louisville to
have the stock transferred to you, which the cashier refused to do.
I thought it my duty to inform you of this, so that you can take
such steps as your attorney may advise."
Some time afterward the appellant's vice president, in company
with Hurter, called at the Bank of Louisville, and demanded a
transfer of the stock into the name of appellant, which was refused
on the ground that Atwood was indebted to the Bank of Louisville,
and that it had a charter lien on its stock for the indebtedness of
stockholders to it.
In that interview Hurter stated, in substance, that, before making
the loan, he had called on the president and cashier of the Bank of
Louisville, and they both told him the bank had no lien on the
stock. This they both denied in the presence of appellant's vice
president.
When the note matured the appellant brought suit upon it against
Atwood, and it also brought suit against the Bank of Louisville to
compel it to transfer the stock. Judgment was recovered against
VOL. XXV.-44
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Atwood, on which an execution issued, which was returned no property found. The Bank of Louisville answered, and set up its lien
on the stock, which was adjudged superior to the lien of appellant,
and the stock was sold, and failed to satisfy the prior lien, whereby
the loan made for the appellant became a total loss.
This action was then brought against the appellee to recover
damages for failing to take sufficient security for the loan.
The appellee, in its answer, denied all charges of negligence, and
averred that it had acted with due caution and circumspection in
making the loan, and also set up and relied upon a ratification of
its acts in the matter after the appellant was in possession of all
the facts and circumstances connected with the transaction.
A trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the appellee.
James S. Pirtle, G. if. Caruth and Thomas Speed, for appellant.
Muir, Bijur and Davie, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COFER, J.-The only ground urged for a reversal is, that the
court erred in instructing the jury in respect to the alleged ratification. The evidence showed, without contradiction, that before the
appellant received the note and collaterals and brought suit against
Atwood and the Bank of Louisville, it knew that the latter claimed
a lien on the stock pledged to secure Atwood's note for an amount
exceeding its value. But it also showed that the appellee's cashier
informed the appellant that before the loan was made the Bank of
Louisville agreed to release its lien, or, what was the same thing,
to transfer the stock on its books into appellant's name. That the
appellee's cashier knew, before he made the loan, that the Bank of
Louisville had a lien on its stock for debts due the bank by the
holders thereof, and that Atwood was then indebted to the bank in
a sum greatly exceeding the value of the stock was not at any time
disputed, the sole matter in dispute being whether it had agreed to
waive its lien when called on by Hurter before he made the loan.
That question was never finally settled until the judgment in favor
of the Bank of Louisville was rendered.
Upon that evidence the court instructed the jury that, if the appellee fairly and fully communicated to the appellant all the facts
and circumstances connected with the' loan, which were known to
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the appellee or its agent, Hurter, and that the appellant knew of
the insolvency of Atwood, and the claim asserted by the Bank of
Louisville and thereafter adopted the transaction, and received the
note and collaterals, and treated tlem as its own, the law was for
the appellee, although it might have been guilty of such negligence
as would otherwise have rendered it liable.
The doctrine that, if an agent has, by a deviation from his orders,
or by any other misconduct or omission of duty, become responsible
to his principal for damages, he will be discharged therefrom by the
ratification of his acts or omissions, by the principal, if made with
a full knowledge of all the facts, is elementary. But the instructions given in this case went further, and held that if the principal,
at the time of accepting the note and collaterals, knew all the facts
touching the loan and affecting the value of the security, which
were then known to the agent, and, with such knowledge, received
them and treated them as its own, the agent was discharged from
liability. We have examined many authorities, both elementary
and judicial, in which the doctrine of ratification, as between principal and agent, is discussed, but we have not found one which considered the good faith of the agent as an element in deciding whether
or not there had been a ratification; but, on the contrary, when.
ever the good faith of the agent has elicited remark, it has been to
the effect that it could have no weight in the decision of that ques.
tion. "Indeed, in all such cases, the question is not whether the
party (agent) has acted from good motives and without fraud, but
whether lie has done his duty and acted according to the confidence
reposed in him :" Story on Agency, sect. 192.
Nor do we find any authority for exonerating a delinquent agent
from liability if he communicates to the principal all the facts known
to him at the time, and the principal ratifies the delinquency, and
it afterwards turns out that the facts as communicated were not the
real facts of the case. In such a case the assumed condition is not
that claimed to have been ratified.
It was the duty of the appellee to loan appellant's money on good
security, or such as a person of common prudence and skill in its
business would have esteemed good. It did loan it upon a security
confessedly sufficient if unencumbered, but which, as the event has
proved, was encumbered to its full value, and, therefore, was no
security at all. The appellee, through its cashier (for whose acts
we assume for the present it was liable), represented that the stock
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was not in lien to the Bank of Louisville; in other words, that the
security was good. To know whether that representation was true
was necessary to enable the appellant to make an election. It is
true it knew the Bank of Louisville asserted a lien, but whether that
lien was superior to the appellant's, or had been waived as appellee
represented, it did not and could not know until the dispute was
settled. We have, therefore, a case in which when the alleged ratification was made both the principal and agent were necessarily
ignorant of the most essential fact in the whole case, and consequently there could not have been such a ratification as would release
the agent from liability, if its conduct had been such that it was
otherwise liable. The gravamen of the appellant's complaint is,
that the appellee negligently failed to take sufficient security for the
loan, and the defence is, that the alleged negligence has been ratified; and yet the uncontradicted evidence is, that at the time of
the supposed ratification, it was not known that there had been the
slightest negligence, or that the security was insufficient. It was
not the act of making the loan that needed to be ratified. That
was expressly authorized. Nor did the acceptance of the bank stock
as security need ratification. The stock was confessedly worth more
than the loan. That which needed ratification was the acceptance
of the stock, subject, as it was, to the lien of the Bank of Louisville,
as security for the loan. If, as the appellee affirmed, it was not
subject to the asserted lien, there had been no negligence and therd
was nothing to ratify. Whether it was subject to that lien was
never known until the suit to test the question was decided, and
then, and not until then, did the appellant obtain a knowledge of
the facts necessary to make an election whether to adopt or repudiate
the acts of its agent.
We have found no case the facts of which are sufficiently like the
facts of this to make the decision rendered a controlling precedent
in this case; but assuming the two fundamental rules of the law
agency, (1) that when the agent has deviated from his duty he
becomes liable to his principal for such losses as are the direct and
natural consequence of such deviation, whether his motives were
good or bad; and (2) that he is only released from that liability
when the principal, with a knowledge of all the facts, ratifies his
departure from his duty, we think there can be no doubt of the correctness of the conclusion we have reached.
There was not only no evidence that the appellant knew at the
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time of the alleged ratification that the appellee had taken insufficient
seciiiitv, but. o, the contrary, the evidence was uncontradicted and
conclusive that it did not, and there was, therefore, no evidence
upon which to base an instruction on the subject of ratification.
None of the cases cited by appellee's counsel are like this. We
cannot undertake to review them one by one, and point out the
distinction between them and this case; but an examination of them
will show that, in every one in which the agent was held to be discharged from liability for deviations from orders or duty, the principd knew, at the time of the ratification, that the agent had not
done his dutv; whereas, in this case, as we have already seen, the
appellant did not, and could not, know but the appellee had taken
annpl, security until it was decided that the Bank of Louisville had
not waived its lieu on the stock.
-Norare we prepared to sanction the doctrine that if an agent to
loan money takes what he knows to be insufficient, security, the
Plrincipl. must at his peril accept the security and discharge the
agent fi'on liability, or reject the security and leave itin the agent's
hands, and look only to the agent for indemnityin the form of damgcs. The more rational and just rule would seem to be that the
principal is entitled to the security taken by his agent, and to look
to the agent for indemnity to the extent of the deficiency which, after
proper diligence, lie shall fail to realize on the security. This view
seems to be sustained by the cases of the Bank of St. Mary's v.
Calder, 3 Strob. 403; Walker v. Tralker, 5 Ileiskell 425; and
by Wharton in his work on Agent and Agency, sect. 67.
Suppose an agent in doubtful circumstances, or a non-resident,
takes security of a doubtful character or one of unknown value, shall
the principal be required to inake his election without an opportu,
nity to test or make inquiry as to its value on pain of either giving
up the security or releasing the agent? Such a. rule does not comin.ld itself to our judgment as either just or reasonable. And in
the case of .Pickett v. Pearson,17 Verm. 470, the court distinctly
intimates that he may take a reasonable time in which to test the
value of the security. Such a rule works no hardship upon the
agent. It can never operate, until he has deviated from his duty,
in a manner to work an injury to the principal, and to' produce a
condition of afflairs which must result in loss to the one or the
other ; and in such a case, both law and justice demand that he whose
deviation from legal duty has necessitated a loss shall bear it. We
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do not mean that an agent shall be held to guarantee the sufficiency
of a security taken by him, but simply to -apply our remarks to
cases in which the agent has so acted that lie would otherwise be
liable to the principal and is compelled to rely upon a ratification
of his acts to escape liability.
It is next contended that Hurter, the cashier, and not the appellee, was appellant's agent and made the loan, and that, therefore,
the appellee is not responsible.
It is a sufficient answer to this to say that no such issue was presented by the answer, and it is there distinctly averred that the
appellee made the loan and took the security.
It is also claimed that the appellee had no authority to act as
agent in loaning money, and is therefore not liable, even if guilty of
negligence in the matter.
The appellee is an incorporated bank, and we are unable to discover in its charter anything which prohibits it from engaging in
any business incident to general banking. The answer presented
no issue upon the point, and we cannot say, as matter of judicial
knowledge, that the loaning of money for a customer is not a part
df the legitimate business of general banking. Whether it is or not
is a question of fact depending upon the custom of banks, and if it
was intended to rely that such business was ultra vires the bank,
the issue should have been made in the answer in order that the
appellant might offer evidence to show that it was incidental to the
business of banking, and therefore within the implied powers of
the appellee.
It seems to us, therefore, that on the pleadings and evidence embodied in the record, the only question involved was whether the
appellee used that care and skill in taking security which, under the
circumstances, it was his duty to use.
If, in view of the character and standing of Atwood at the time
the loan was made, the knowledge-the appellee (or what is the same
thing, its cashier) had of the lien on the collaterals given to the
Bank of Louisville by its charter, what took place between the appellee's cashier and the officers of the Bank of Louisville, and his information as to Atwood's indebtedness to it, the loan would not have
been made on the security taken by a person of ordinary prudence
and skill in banking, the appellee is liable; otherwise, it is not.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial upon
principles not inconsistent with this opinion.
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For sneering, insulting, and disrespectful language ued by an attorney to a
judge before whom a matter is pending, concerning such matter and the judge's
ruling thereon, the attorney may be punished by a fine, as for a contempt.
Such language as the following, coming from an attorney to a judge in a matter
still pending before him: "The ruling you have made is directly contrary to every
principle of law, and everybody knows it, I believe;" and that It is ",my desire that
no seck decision shall stand unreversed in any court I practice in," is Insulting
and disrespectful.
It is immaterial whether this language is used in oral address in the hearing of
others, or in a written communication to the judge.
An attorney, as an officer of the court, is under special obligations to be con.
siderate and respectful in his conduct and communications to the court or judge.
A judge will do wisely to overlook any mere hasty unguarded expression of passion or disappointment, even though disrespectful, or simply notice it by a reproof.
But where an attorney insists upon a right to use such disrespectful language, or
is in the habit of so using it, or fails, when his attention is called to it, to apologize
therefor, it may become the clearest duty of the judge to punish him for a contempt.
On an appeal from an order punishing for contempt, the mere question of the
advisability of the court's action is not the matter of consideration ; it is the question of power, and whether the act or word punished is in fact a contempt.

from an order of CAMPBELL, J., adjudging S. D. Prior
guilty of contempt.
APPEAL

T. HeDonald, for appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BREWER, J.-Motions to dissolve certain injunctions were argued
before Hon. W. P. CAMPBELL, district judge of the 13th Judicial
District. The motions were taken under advisement and a few days
thereafter word was sent by the judge to the counsel for plaintiff,
advising him of the overruling of the motions. This information
was conveyed to the counsel for defendant, one of whom wrote and
forwarded the following letter :"Winfield, Cowley County, Kansas, June 26th 1876.
Hon.'W. P. CAMPBELL:Dear Sir: Mr. Hackney this evening informed me that he had
received a letter from you stating that you had overruled the motions
to dissolve those injunctions. I can hardly believe that such is the
fact, for it is directly contrary.to every prirnspek of law governing
iijunctions and everybody knows it, I believe.

Consequently we

send herewith orders dissolving said injunctions.

But if you have
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concluded to overrule said motions, as Hackney says, you will please
allow our exceptions to each and every of your rulings and allow
us time to make and file our case in Supreme Court, which we will
do as quick as it can be done. For it is our desire that no 8uch
decisions or orders shall stand unreversed in any court we practice
in; also fix terms for staying orders.
Yours respectfully,
PRIOR, KAGER & PRIOR."

The judge on the receipt of this letter construed it as a contempt,
issued his warrant for the arrest of the writer, and after a hearing
adjudged him guilty of contempt, fined him fifty dollars therefor,
and suspended him from practice.in the courts of that district until
the fine should be paid.
The question presented for our consideration is whether this ruling
and order of the judge shall be set aside or p~rmitted to stand. It
appears from other testimony in the case, as well as from the intimations in the letter, that no orders had actually been signed.
Notice of his conclusions had simply been given and the attorneys
requested to prepare the formal order; the matter was therefore
still pending before him.
Upon this we remark in the first place that the language of this
letter is very insulting. To say to a judge that a certain ruling
which he has made is contrary to every principle of law and that
everybody knows it, is certainly a most severe imputation. The
learned counsel for appellant says in his brief:"There is nothing in Mr. Prior's letter to Judge CAMPBELL that
is insulting, contemptuous, or even the least disrespectful. Mr.
Prior simply tells the judge, in a plain matter-of-fact way, that he
has committed an error of law in his decision, if such decision is as
fias been represented to him, and in that event requests that his
exceptions thereto may be allowed, to the end that he may have an
opportunity of presenting the matter' to the Supreme Court for
review. There is no reflection upon the motives of the judge, in
rendering such decision, or imputation upon his integrity; nothing
in fact to which, in the light of reason and fairness, any possible
intention of contempt can be attached. In the warrant issued for
the arrest of Mr. Prior, the judge states that the letter was written
for the purpose of Iinsulting, abusing and intimidating' him.
There is nothing insulting in the letter-unless it is an insult to
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this judge for an attorney to disagree With him upon a question of
law; nothing abusive about it, unless it is the unpardonable temerity
of the expressions that evidence the dissent on the part of the
attorney from the exposition of the law by the judge; nothing
about it calculated to 'intimidate,' unless it is the statement that
the disputed question will be referred to the Supreme Court for
review."
We cannot concur in this construction of. the letter. It is not
merely an assertion of a difference of opinion, but a charge that he
has decided in a way that he as well as everybody else knew to be
wrong. To say to a judge that his ruling is contrary to every principle of law, may be simply a reflection upon his intelligence, but
to couple with it an assertion that everybody knows it, is clearly an
imputation upon his integrity. How can a judge be honest and
yet decide contrary to that which he as well as all others know to
be the law?

,

We remark, secondly, that an attorney is under special obligations
to be considerate and respectful in his conduct and communications
to a judge. He is an officer of the court and it is therefore his duty
to. uphold its honor and dignity. Certain privileges attach to him
by reason of such official position. He may in the trial of cases
use language concerning witnessel and parties, and all matters and
things in issue, which elsewhere and under other circumstances
would be libellous. By virtue of this privilege, we often hear from
the lips of counsel in argument, or read in the briefs filed in proceedings in error in this court, the most severe animadversion and criticism upon the conduct and rulings of the courts from which the
proceedings are brought. They have the same right of criticising
the rulings and conduct of those courts in proceedings pending here
that they have in those courts of criticising the actions and conduct
under review there. In other words, the independence of the profession carries with it the right freely to challenge, criticise and
condemn all matters and things under review qd in evidence.
But.with this privilege goes the corresponding obligation of constant courtesy and respect towards the tribunal in which the proceedings are pending. And the fact that the tribunal is an inferior
one and its rulings not final and without appeal, does not diminish
in the slightest degree this obligation of courtesy and respect. A
justice of the peace, before whom the most trifling matter is being
litigated, is entitled to receive from every attorney in the case
Voa. XXV.-
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courteous and respectful treatment. le is pro hae vice the representative of the law as fully as the chiefjustice of the United States
in the most important case pending before him. A failure to extend
this courteous and respectful treatment is a failure of duty, and it
may be so gross a dereliction as to warrant the exercise of the power
to punish for contempt. Now, as we have said, the language of the
letter is insulting. It would be so regarded outside of judicial proceedings and in the intercourse of gentlemenm To charge another
with knowingly doing an illegal act would always be regarded as an
imputation to be resented. Change the circumstances alittle; suppose in a public trial in the court house, after a ruling had been
made, an attorney in the case should say to the court, "that ruling
is not the law and your honor knows it ;" who would doubt that the
court might rightly treat such language as contempt and punish it
accordingly? Yet practically that is this case. Theifat tiat in the
case supposed others are listening and hear the words and in this
the language reaches the judge alone does not change the quality
of the act. It will be borne in mind that the remarks we have
made apply only while the matters which give rise to the words or
acts of the attorney are pending and undetermined. Other considerations apply after the matters have finally been determined, the
orders signed or the judgment entered. For no judge and no court,
high or low, is beyond the reach of public and individual criticism.
After a case is disposed of a court or judge has no power to compel
th public or any individual thereof, attorney or otherwise, to consider his rulings correct, his conduct proper, or even his integrity
free from stain, or to punish for contempt any mere criticism or
animadversion thereon, no matter how severe or unjust. Nor do we
wish to be understood as expressing any opinion as to the power to
punish others than attorneys and officers of the court for language
or conduct, even while the matter is pending and undetermined.
Whether the same rules and considerations apply to them or not
we do not care to inquire. Such is not the case before us, and to
this case alone do our remarks apply. We remark again, that a
judge will generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and
unguarded expression of passion or at least pass it with simply a
reproof. It is so, that in every case where a judge decides for one
party he decides against another, and ofttimes both parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The disappointment therefore
is great, and it is not in human nature that there should be other than
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bitter feeling, which often reaches to thejudge as the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge therefore ought to be patient and tolerant of
everything which appears to be only the momentary outbreak of disappointment. A secondl thoughtwill generally make a party ashamed
of such outbreak, and the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in silence. On the other hand, a little thing, which is properly
unnoticed once, may by its repetition require notice and punishment.
It is but a little matter to whisper a single time in the presence of
a court in session, but if.repeated and the monitions of the court
disregarded, it may become not merely the privilege, but the clearest
duty of the court to punish for contempt. So, an attorney, sometimes, thinking it a mark of independence, may become wont to use
contemptuous, angry or insulting expressions at every adverse ruling, until it becomes the court's clear duty to check the habit by
the severe lesson of a punishment for contempt. The single insult.
ing expression for which the court punishes may therefore seem
to those knowing nothing of the prior conduct of the attorney, and
looking only at the single remark, a matter which might well be
unnoticed, and yet if all the conduct of the attorney was known the
duty of interference and punishment might be clear. We make
these suggestions not as intimating that such has been the prior
conduct of the attorney in this case, for we neither know nor have
heard anything outside of this single matter which reflects at all
upon him. We do it simply to indicate that the wisdom or necessity
of the court's action is not always disclosed by the single matter
apparent in the record, and that therefore in a matter like this, involving personal conduct toward the court, a large regard must be paid
to its discretion. If the language or conduct of the attorney is
insulting or disrespectful, and in the presence, real or constructive,
of the court, and during the pendency of certain proceedings, i¢e
cannot hold that the court exceeded its power by punishing for contempt. See generally on the subject of contempt, 5th ed., 2 Bishop
on Crim. Law, ch. 12, sect. 242, and following, and cases cited: 4
Blackstone 283; Commonwbalth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cases 408.
We remark, finally, that while from the very nature of things the
power of a court to punish for contempt is a vast power and one
which in the hands of a corrupt or unworthy judge may be used
tyrannically and unjustly, yet protection to individuals lies in the
publicity of all judicial proceedings and the appeal which may be
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made to the legislature for proceedings against any judge who
proves himself unworthy of the power intrusted to him.
The conclusion then to which we have come is that the order of
the district judge must be affirmed. It perhaps should be added,
that in the long answer made by the appellant to the order to show
cause why lie should not be- punished, he tenders no apology and
expresses no regret for the language used, but insists upon his right
to use it.
Supreme Court of Nebraska..
TIE CITY OF OMAHAI

v. ELLEN OLMSTEAD.

Municipal corporations charged by statute or by charters accepted by them with
the care of streets are liable for injuries caused by defective pavements.
The mere interest of a resident or taxpayer of a city is not, unaer ordinary circumstances, sufficient to disqualify him as a juror in a case where the city is a
party.
ELLEN OLMSTEAD, as plaintiff in the court below, brought suit
to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by
her in stepping into a hole in a sidewalk, on the north side of
Douglas street, between Ninth and Tenth streets, in the city of
Omaha.

All material allegations of the petition were denied by the answers.
And it was further alleged that any injuxy received by plaintiff was
occasioned by reason of her own carelessness. The time of the
accident, as alleged, was about 8 o'clock in the evening of December
1st 1873.
A trial was had at the February term 1876, at which a verdict
was returned for the plaintiff, fixing her damages at five thousand
dpllars, which verdict was set aside and a new trial granted on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain it.
The case again came on for trial at the October term of the court,
before lon. S. B. POUND, judge, and on the trial in the court
below Ferdinand Streitz was regularly. called as a juror, and in response to questions put by plaintiff's attorney, made answers showing
that he was a duly qualified juror in all other respects, but that he
was a resident and taxpayer of the city of Omaha-whereupon
plaintiff's attorney challenged said juror for cause, in that he was a
taxpayer in the city of Omaha, and hence an interested party;
which challenge the court sustained, and the juror was excused, to
which defendant duly excepted.
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Several other jurors were duly called, examined, challenged by
the defendant and excused in like manner mid for the same cause.
A verdict was returned by the jury for the plaintiff, fixing her damages at $5500. A motion for a new trial was duly made, which
-was overruled and a judgment entered upon the verdict; to reverse
which judgment the defendant in the court below now prosecutes
its petition in error.
The question raised was: Is a resident taxpayer of a municipal
corporation disqualified thereby from sitting upon a jury in which
the city is a party?
The opinion of the court was delivered by
AIAXWELI, J.-The plaintiff in error is organized as a city under
the provisions of " An Act to incorporate cities of the first class."
Sect. 15 of the act gives to the mayor and council the care, management and control of the city, its property and fin-mces. The
twenty-fourth subdivision of sect. 15 grants the power to care for
and control, to name and rename streets, avenues, parks, and squares
within the city, to provide for the opening and vacating of streets,
avenues and alleys within the city, under such restrictions and regulations as may be provided b' law.
Sect. 41 provides that the.council shall have power to open, extend, widen, grade, pave, or otherwise improve and keep in good
repair or cause the same to be done in any manner they may deem
proper, any street, avenue or alley within the limits of the city,
and may also construct and repair, or cause and compel the construction and repair of sidewalks in such city, of such material and
in such manner as they may deem proper and necessary, and to defray the cost and expense of such improvement on any of them, the
mayor and council of such city shall have power and authority to
levy and collect special taxes and assessments upon the lots and
pieces of ground adjacent to and abutting upon the street, avenue,
alley or sidewalk thus graded, paved, extended, constructed or
otherwise improved or repaired.
Sect. 49 provides that the council shall have power to provide
for keeping sidewalks clean and free from all obstructions and accumulations, and may provide for the assessment and collection of
taxes on unoccupied real estate, and for the sale and conveyance
thereof to pay the expenses of keeping the sidewalks adjacent to
such real estate clear and free from obstructions and accumulations
as herein provided.
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By an act of the legislature approved November-4th 1858, the
city of Omaha was incorporated under a special charter which conferred certain benefits and privileges upon the city. On the 8th
day of February 1869, an act to incorporate cities of the first class
becune a law. The first section provides that all cities within this
state having three thousand legal voters shall be deemed cities of
the first class.
Sect. 64 provides that all r'ights and property of every description
which were vested in any municipal corporation, under its former
organization, shall be deemed and held to be vested in the same
municipal corporation under the organizati6n made by this act. It
will not be denied that an act providing for the incorporation of a
city must be accepted as a whole, and that the city in accepting the
benefits derived therefrom must perform the duties required by law.
The corIjorate franchise is a valuable privilege, and is a sufficient
consideration for the duties which the law imposes. The stiae grants
to the municipality a portion of its sovereign authority, in greater
powers of self-government than are given to quasi corporations, in
increased facilities for the acquisition and control of corporate property, and in special authority over and control of the streets, and
their adaptation to the wants and convenience of the citizens of the
municipality. The acceptance of these privileges is considered as
raising an implied promise on the part of the city to perform its
corporate duties, and this implied agreement made with the sovereign
power enures to the benefit of every individual interested in the
proper performance of such duties: Cooley's Con. Lim. 248; West
v. Brocekport, 16 N. Y. 161; Pittsburghv. Grier, 22 Penna. St.
54; Browning v. Springfield, 17 Ill. 143; Weightman v. Wash,
1 Black 41; 2 Black 418 and 590. The city has the exclusive
control of its streets, and ample means are placed under the control
of its constituted authorities to maintain the streets in a safe condition. Under these circumstances the city is liable for its failure to
perform its duty.
In -Detroitv. Blakely, 21 Mich., it was held (CooLEY, J., dissenting) that the city was not liable. The court say: "In the case
of Eastman v. Xeredith, 86 N. 11. 248, the distinction between the
English and American municipal corporations is clearly defined.
The former often hold special property and franchises of a profitable
nature which they have received upon conditions and which they hold
by the same indefeasible right as individuals. But American
municipalities hold their functions merely as governing agencies."

BUENOS AYRES RY. CO. v. NORTHERN RY. CO.

While it is true that in particular instances property and valuable franchises of a profitable nature were confirred upon municipal
corporations as a condition for the performance of certain acts, yet
it will not be contended that all or any considerable proportion of
such corporations were thus endowed. Nor will it be claimed that
liability for neglect of duty was restricted to corporations thus benefIted. I think it will be found on examination that, as a rule, as
valuable privileges and benefits are conferred by our laws providing
for the incorporation of cities as were conferred by ancient charters.
In selecting jurors the object of the law is to secure fair, unbiassed persons, and it is the duty of the court, when objection is
made, to see that such persons only are permitted to sit on a jury.
But the mere interest of a taxpayer and resident of the city is not
of itself, under ordinary circumstances, sufficient to disqualify him
from acting as a juror in a case in which the city is interested. In
this case both parties objected to residents of Omaha as jurors, and
the objections were sustained by the court. The plaintiff therefore
is hot in a position to insist on the objection. A fair jury appears
to have been selected, and the questions of fact fairly submitted to
them, and we see no sufficient ground to disturb their finding. The
judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed.

RECENT ENGLISH

DECISIONS.

figh Court of Justice, Queen's Bene D-ivision.
THE BUENOS AYRES AND ENSENADA PORT RAILWAY CO. v.
THE NORTHERN RAILWAY CO. OF BUENOS AYRES.
The claim stated that plaintiffs and defendants were limited companies with registered offices in London : and that the action was brought for the rent of a railway
station in Buenos Ayres, and for part of the cost of constructing lines of railway
and approaches to the station. The statement of defence was that both plaintiff
and defendant were domiciled in Buenos Ayres and carried on business there;
that the premises in question were constructed on land which was the property of
the repuflic of Buenos Ayres, and that plaintiffs and defendants were joint concessionaires under the republic of certain easements appurtenant thereto ; that the
construction of the premises was directed by the government of Buenos Ayres,
which by its laws had powers of adjusting all rights arising out of such matter ;
that the contract, if any, as to the cost of construction was made at Buenos Ayres
and was subject to the law of the place of contract, and that the republic had
assumed jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claim. h1eld, on demurrer that the defence
was not good either on the ground of venue or of the comity of nations, as both
parties were within the jurisdiction of the court and the facts alleged did not show
that the jurisdiction of the Argentine republic over the claim was exclusive.
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DEMURIER to the first six paragraphs of the statement of defence,
which are fully set out in the judgment of the court.

TIirupp, for .the plaintiff, cited Mostyn v. Fabrigas,1 Sm. Lead.
Cas., 5th cd., p. 607, and distinguished Wditaker v. Porbes, 1
Coin. Pleas Div. 51.
Benjamin, contra.
February 2d, the opinion of the court was delivered by
MELLOR, J.-By the statement of claim the plaintiffs, who are a
limited company, having their registered office at 8 Union court,
Broad street, in the city of London, sue the defendants, whose
registered office is at No. 40, Finsbury Circus, in the city of London, for certain rents, maintenance, and a certain sum for the defendants' share in the construction of certain lines of railway,
buildings, premises, and approaches to the central station in the city
of Buenos Ayres, which the defendants were, in January 1873, let
into the beneficial use and occupation of, on the'terms that th.ey
should pay to the plaintiffs' company annually the rent and maintenance for, and of the said station, lines of railway, buildings and
premises, and the rent for the said approach usual in similar cases,
and that the defendants have occupied and use the same and the
said approach since January 1873. To this the defendants, in the
first six paragraphs of their statement of defence, plead that the
plaintiffs' and defendafts' companies are respectively domiciled in
the Argentine republic, and carrying on their business there;
that the central station mentioned in the plaintiffs' statement ig
constructed on land which is the property of the said republic; and
that the plaintiffs and defendants are joint concessionaires under
the said republic of certain easements appurtenant thereto, the
rights of the plaintiffs not being in any way superior to those of
the defendants, who further allege that the construction of the said
central station was directed by the government of the said republic,
and was for the benefit and convenience of the citizens of the said
city of Buenos Ayres, and by the express provision of the laws of
the republic; that powers of adjusting all rights arising out of the
said construction properly applicable to the claim of the plaintiffs are
vested in the government, and that any express or implied contract
which can be proved to exist between the plaintiffs and the defendants with respect to the distribution of the cost of the construction
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was made at Buenos Ayres, and is subject to the law of the place
of contract. It then alleges that the republic has assumed jurisdiction over the claim of the plaintiffs. The defendants then submit
that as the claim relates to immovable property, situate in a foreign
country, the High Court of Justice has not jurisdiction over the same,
and that to assume it would be a violation of the comity of nations,
and that the contract having been made at Buenos Ayres, it cannot be conveniently investigated before the High Court. These are
the substantial allegations upon which this portion of the statement
of defence is founded, and by which the defendants seek to oust the
jurisdiction of this court to entertain the claim.
Mr. Benjamin disclaimed any intention of arguing the case on
any technical ground of venue. He rested his contention on higher
grounds of policy and convenience and comity of nations. In looking carefully into the allegations made in the first six paragraphs
of the statement of defence, I cannot find any allegation which
claims or asserts exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of the Argentine republic to entertain this matter ; and, although suggestions
are made and hints given, there is no specific allegation which can
be fairly, so interpreted.
It seems to me that, consistently with all these allegations, the
plaintiffs are entitled to sue the defendants in this country in respect
of the matters alleged in the claim. Both plaintiffs and defendants are in England, although they may be, as allege.d, domiciled
in the Argentine republic; they are not aliens, and there is nothing stated as to the law of the republic or the contract of the parties
which is inconsistent with the power to sue in England. Both parties to the action are within the jurisdiction of the courts of this
country, and the action, as far as prooedure is concerned, has been
properly initiated; and, although it is alleged that, by the express
provision of the laws of the republic, powers of adjusting alf rights
arising out of the said construction properly applicable to the claim
of the plaintiffs are vested in the government, that does not show
that a contract by which a money compensation is agreed to be
paid by the defendants to the plaintiffs for the beneficial use by the
defendants of the plaintiffs' construction, may not be enforced before
another forum. In short, I can find no allegation which asserts
that jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the claim is, either by
law or contract of the parties, vested exclusively in the courts of the
VOL. XXV.-46
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Argentine republic. When the allegations contained in the statement of defence are carefully analyzed, they amount to this only:
that the contract was made in a foreign country, and that it relates
to the use of property in such foreign country in which both parties have a domicile, and cannot be sued upon in this country,
although both parties are within the jurisdiction of this court. The
alleged convenience of one tribunal over another for the investigation
of the claim is beside the question of jurisdiction; and as to the allegation that to entertain the claim in this country would be a violation
of the comity of nations, or, as was argued by Mr. Benjamin, be
disrespectful to the Argentine republic, that is in my opinion an
assertion without any authority, and I cannot regard it. Lastly,
he contended that, in deciding upon this question, we are dealing
with an act of state. I confess myself unable to follow or see the
effect of that argument, or how it arises upon the facts as alleged.
It is true that the statement of defence asserts that the government
of the Argentine republic has assumed jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claim. I can see in that fact no act of state in the sense contended for by Mr. Benjamin, and it appears to me difficult to apprehend the effect of that allegation. A statement of defence which
is intended by way of plea to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
country, must be precise and clear, which is certainly not the case
with the allegation in question. I cannot, carefully reading the
allegation in the statement of defence, find any obstacle to my giving judgment in favor of the demurrer.
Judgment 'or the plaintiffs.
Rigidly as the rule in regard to local
actions has been enforced in England
at all times, it would have been useless
in the present case to have relied upon
it, since-the claim grew out of contract
and was therefore of a transitory character. While referring the reader to
the note on Mostyn v. Fabrigas, Hare
& Wallace's edition of Smith's Leading
Cases, for a more elaborate discussion
of the subject of local and transitory
actions than the limits of a note here
will permit, it may be not altogether
u-clcss to call his attention briefly to
the rule, the reason for it and to some
of the recent cases.
The old rule of the common law was

that "injuries to real estate are local
and must be redressed by an action in
the county where the land is situated."
So where the obligation arises in respect
to the esate and not to the person, the
action to enforce the obligation is local.
Thus an action of covenant by the assignee of the reversion against the
lessor, or vice versa, upon an express
covenant contained in the lease, is transitory by the operation of 32 Henry
VIII., ch. 34, 577 ; while debt, by the
assignee or devisee of the lessor against
the lessee, which is founded upon privity of estate, is a local action : I Chitty
on Plendings 301. See Chirkv. Scuddcr,
6 Gray (Mass.) 123, where an action
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by the assignee of the covenantee
against the covenanter on a covenant
respecting land was held to be local,
the action depending on the privity
of estate and not of contract.
The reason of the adoption of this rule
arose out of the constitution of the old
jury, who were but witnesses to prove
and disprove the allegations of the
pleadings. It was necessary that actions
should be brought in such places that
those familiar with the necessary evidence should be able to testify; and as
the sheriff must summon the jury from
the county where the action was laid
in the declaration, it was essential while
the jury were the witnesses for, and not
the judges of, the evidence, to lay the
venue truly. The inconvenience and
evasion of justice which followed this
rule caused it to be gradually relaxed,
under the subtle device of a videlicet,
until in most cases the form only of the
old rule was observed while the spirit
had wholly departed. Those cases in
which the rigor of former times bad
not been relaxed in this respect became
known as local actions and may be
classified as those cases in which an
injury is done to land (and through the
possession or ownership of it, to the
plaintiff), and the cases already referred to in which a duty is owed in
respect to land held or owned by the
defendant. The latter division of this
class has already been noticed. The
law is to this day the same in England
and in most of the United States. In
ll itaker v. Forbes, Law Rep. 10 C. P.
583; s. c. affirmed on appeal, 1 C. P.
D. 51, the action was debt brought in
the Common Pleas of England, for
arrears of a rent-charge upon lands in
Australia, prior to the operation of the
new Judicature Act (which provided
that in the future there should be no
distinction between local and personal
actions as regards venue.) It was held
both in the Common Pleas and Court
of Appeal that the venue was local and

that the action therefore could not he
maintained in England. CAIns, L.
C., while regretting the anomalous rule
by which, though both parties were in
England, and perhaps never out of it,
the action could not be maintained, felt
himself bound, as did MARSHALL, C. J.,
in Livingstone v. Jeffeerson, post, by the
authority of the decisions of Pine v.
Countess of Licester, Hob. 37 ; TDaursby
v. Plant, I Notes to Win. Saund. 306308. There was no authority for the
proposition that the rule was inapplicable
where the land lay out of England.
BRAMWELL, B., in the same case,
referred to Livingstone v. .Teffer.on, post,
"where the law jon this subject seems
to have been ably summarized by MARSHALL, C.

J."

As regards the cases which fall under
the former division, i. e., injuries to real
estate, there has been some diversity of
opinion both in England and in this
country. In the case of Jfosttn v. 14brigas, sipra, s. c. Cowper 180, though
the question there raised a different
point, since the injury was admittedly
personal, MANSFIELD, C. J., referred
to two cases in which, as he said. " the
very gist of the action was local," and
in which the objection was overruled.
"I think it was an action brou,t
against Captain Gambier, who, by order
of Admiral Boscawen, had pulled down
the houses of some sutlers who supplied
the navy and sailors with spirituous
liquors. * * * The objection was taken
to the count for pulling down the houses.
On the other side they produced, from a
manuscript note, a case before Lord
Chief Justice EYRE, where he overruled
the objection, and I overruled the objection upon this principle, viz., that the
reparation here was personal and for
damages, and that otherwise there would
be a failure of justice. I quoted a case
of injury of that sort in the East Indies,
where, even in the court of equity,
Lord IIARDwICKE had directed satisfac"
tion to be made in damages. * * I re-
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collect another cause that came on before me, which was the case of Admiral
Palliser. There the very gist of the
action was local. It was for destroying
fishing-huts upon .the Labrador coast.
Tire cause went on a great way. They
would have stopped it short at once if
they could have made such objection,
but it was not made. Whatever injury
had been done there by any of the king's
officers, would have been altogether
without redress if the objection of locality would have held."
According to the principle that English law in force prior to the revolution
is the law of this country in the absence
of legislation on the subject, these cases
would seem to be of greater authority
here against the rule than the later decisions made in England, in which the
above cases were disapproved of. It is
somewhat singular that in the cases
which have arisen in this country this
argument seems not to have been employed. Doul.son v. ifathews (1792),
4 Term Rep. 503, is the leading case on
this subject in favor of the rule. The
action was trespass for entering the
plaintiff's dwelling-houge in Canada,
and expelling him. Lord KE.Tyow, at
the trial, was of opinion that the action
was local and accordingly nonsuited
Erskie subsequently
the plaintiff.
moved to set aside the nonsuit, observing that the action was not to recover
land, but merely a personal action to
He
recover satisfaction in damages.
then referred to the cases mentioned by
Lord MANSFIELD. Lord KnNyoN, C.
J., said that the contrary had been
held in a case in the Common Fleas,
that where the action is on the realty,
it is local.

BULLER, J. : " It is now too

late for us to inquire whether it were
wise or politic to make a distinction
between transitory and local actions.
It is sufficient for the courts that the law
has settled the distinction, and that an
action quare clausum fregit is local.
We may try actions here, which are in

their nature transitory, though arising
out of a transaction abroad, but not
such as are in their nature local. Rule
refused."
1l'arre v. 'Wc-bh, I Taunt. 379, was
case by the owner of a house against
the adjoining owner for neglecting to
repair tire latter's spout, w.hercby rain
soaked through into, and injured the
plaintiff's house in Surrey, to wit, at
1'estainaster, in the county of 11iddlesex.
The action was held not maintainable
on the ground of variance between the
declaration and evidence. See Sinimons
v. Lillystone, post, in which it is said
that this case is difficult to understand.
In Richardson v. Locdin, 6 B. & S.
775, the action was case for tire wrongful diversion of a public footway whereby
the plaintiff lawfully passing along the
footway was injured. The venue was
in Surrey ; the footway was in Essex.
The action was held local. " In substance," said BLACKBURN, J., it is
an action for injury arising from a nuisance on real property, which is clearly
a local action."
Jefferies v. Duacombe, 11 East 227, is
an instance of the attempt of tie court to
distinguish by metaphysical evasions,
wherejustice would otherwise be denied.
As remarked by ExERY, J., in Titus v.
Franfort, 15 Maine 98, it "serves to
show that there continued down to the
time when it was decided in 1809, a
disposition to carp at the mode of presenting to the court a case of consequential injury to the person, when the cause
of action arose in a particular plice,
though immaterial, and the readiness
with which the court, in pursuit of justice, discountenanced such objections."
In Jefferies v. Duncombe (wlrere the
action was case for keeping a lighted
lamp in front of the plaintiff's house, in
order to throw upon him the imputation of being the keeper of a bawdyhouse), the cause of action couhl not
have arisen out of the county in which
tire premises lay, for the point of the
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offence lay in the designation of the
place where the plaintiff resided, and
opposite to which the lamp was hung.
It is true that the action was not for
injury to the realty, but the possession
of the realty by the plaintiff was certainly a causa sine qua non without which
the particular injury could not have been
inflicted. The action was held transitory. See The Mersey and Irwell Navigation Compang v. Douglas, 2 East 499.
Simmons v. Lillgstone, 8 Exch. Rep.
(Wels., Hurl. & Gor.) 431, was case.
The. declaration laid the venue inLondon, and stated that the plaintiff owned real estate in Kent, abutting on the Thames, to which river he
ought to have from his adjoining premises free access, and to the navigation
of which he was entitled; yet the defendant had obstructed an adjoining
portion of the said river, whereby the
plaintiff received special damage. Averdiet was entered for the plaintiff,
with leave reserved to the defendant to
move to enter it for him. The rule
was discharged, the court holding that
there was no allegation in the declaration which made it necessary for the
plaintiff to prove that the obstruction
took place in the city of London.
The rule is in force in the federal
courts. Livingstonev. .Tefferson, 1 Brockenbrough 203, was trespass, g- c..f.,
brought in the Circuit Court of the United
States for Virginia, for a trespass alleged
to have been committed by the defendant, ex-President Jefferson, upon real
estate in Louisiana. The venue was
laid in New Orleans, "to wit, at Richmond, in the county of Henrico, and
district of Virginia." MA SHALL, C.
J., doubted the wisdom of the rule, but
felt bound by the precedents.
"This is known to be a fiction. Like
an ejectment, it is the creature of the
courts, and is moulded to the purposes
of justice, according to the views which
its inventors have taken of its capacity
to effect those purposes. It is not, how-

ever, of undefinable extent. Ithas not
absolutely prostrated all distinctions of
place, but has certain limits prescribed
to it, founded in reasoning satisfactory
to those who have gradually fixed those
limits. It may well be doubted whether
at this day they might be changed by a
judge not perfectly satisfied with their
extent.
"This fiction is so far protected by
its inventors that the averment is not
traversable for the purpose of defeating
an action it was invented to sustain, but
it is traversable whenever such traverse
may be essential to the merits of the
cause. It is always traversable for the
purpose of contesting a jurisdiction not
intended to be protected by the fiction.
"In the case at bar, it is traversed
for that purppse ; and the question is
whether this is a case in which such
traverse is sustainable, or in other
words, whether the courts have so far
extended their fiction as, by its aid, to
take cognisance of actions of trespass
on lands not lying within those limits
which bound their process.
"They have, without legislative aid,
applied this fiction to all personal torts,
wherever the wrong may have been committed, and to all contracts wherever
executed. To this general rule contracts respecting lands form no exception. It is admitted that on a contract respecting lands an action is sustainable wherever the defendant may be
found. Yet in such a case every difficulty may occur that presents itself in
an action of trespass. An investigation of title may become necessary; a
question of boundary may arise, and a
survey may be essential to the full
merits of the cause. Yet these difficulties have not prevailed against the
jurisdiction of the court. They are
countervailed and more than countervailed, by the opposing consideration,
that if the action be disallowed, the injured party may have a clear right
without a remedy, in a case where a
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person who has done the wrong, and them, yet the assize in confinio comitatus
who ought to make the compensation, is doth lie, and the justices shall sit letween the said counties:' Co. Litt. 154
within the power of the court.
"That this consideration should lose a. And if a declaration contained matits influence where the action pursues a ter lying in two counties, it was tried
thing not in the reach of the court is by both counties on a venire directed to
of inevitable necessity ; but for the.lpss the sheriff of both counties, who sumof its influence where the remedy is moned six of each county. But such
against the person, and is within the proceedings have long been obsolete,
power of the court, I have not yet dis- and the doctrine established in Bu wer's
Case, 7 Rep. 2 a, has ever since been
cerned a reason, ether than a technical
held, as law both in England and this
one, which can satisfy my judgment.
"If, however, this technical reason is country; 'that where the action is
firmly established, if all other judges founded on two things done in several
respect it, I cannot venture to disregard counties, and both are material and traversable, and the one without the other
it.
"The distinction taken is that actions doth not maintain the action, then the
are deemed transitory where the trans- plaintiff may bring his action in which
actions on which they are founded might of the counties he will.' Thus if a
have taken place anywhere, but are man does not repair a well in Essex
local where their cause is, in its nature, which he ought to repair, whereby my
land in Middlesex is drowned, I may
necessarily local.
"If this distinction is established; if "bring my action in Essex, for there is
judges have determined to carry their the default, as it is adjudged in 7.Hen.
IV., 8, or I may bring it in Middlesex,
innovation on the old rule no further;
if, under circumstances which have not for there I have the damage, as is proved
changed, they have determined this to by 11 R. I. Action sur the case 36;
be the limit of their fiction for a long
Gowen T. Husse, 1 Dyer 38 a; Sott v.
course of time, it would require a Brest, 2 Term R. 241 ; fayor v. Cole,
hardihood which, sitting in this place, 7 Id. 583; Rex v. Burdett, 4 B. &
I cannot venture on to pass this limit."2 Aid. 95 ; Oliphant v. Smith, 3 Penna.
But each district of the federal courts R. 180. His honor held that thevenue
is considered as a county, and it is no was well laid in New Jersey, "which as
objection to the jurisdiction of a federal regards this (the Circuit Court of the
court that the action is local, provided United States) forms one county."
ll'orster v. lVinaipiseogee Luie Co., 5
the premises are situated in the district
in which the action is brought: Rundle Foster (N. H.) 525, was case for the
v. Tie Delaware and Raritan Canal, I overflow of the plaintiff's'land. GILWallace, Jr. 275. The action here was CHRIST, C. J., there said :--" Actions,
case brought in the New Jersey district though merely for damages occasioned
for the wrongful diversion of water in by injuries to real property, are local I
New Jersey, whereby the plaintiff's mills as trespass or case for negligence to
in Pennsylvania were injured. GRiER, houses, lands, watercourses, ways, or
J. : " Formerly where a nuisance other real property : I Chitty's Pl.
was done in one county to lands lying 298; Gould's Pl. 115, 116. * * * It is
in another, an assisa in confinio contita- a general rule that case for an injury to
tits lay at common law (Fitz. Nat. land is a local action, and that the suit
albeit,' says Lord should be brought in the county where
'And
Brev.)
CoKE, ' the counties do not adjoin, but the cause of action arose."
Ilratts v. Kinney, 23 Wend. (N. Y.)
there be twenty counties mean between
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484, was an action on the case for diverting the waters of a stream and
obstructing a right of way at Newark,
in New Jersey. The declaration dc.
scribed the subject-matter as " situate,
lying, and being in the township of
Newark, in the state of New Jersey, to
wit, at the city and county of New
York." On error to the Superior Court
of New York, NEasost, C. J., said :"It appears to be conclusively settled,
that an action on the case for diverting
a watercourse, so far savors of the
realty as to be-classed with local actions,
and must be tried in the county where
the injury happens. It stands on a
footing in this respect with real and
mixed actions, such as trespass quare
clausum fregit, ejectment, waste, &c.,
where if the lands lie in a foreign
country they cannot be tried here."
On error brought to the Court of
Errors, reported in 6 Hill 82, WALWORT , C., said :-" The cause of
action stated in the declaration is unquestionably Idcal, not only by the
provisions of the Revised Statutes, but
also by the settled rule of the common
law."
In Roach v. Dainron, 2 Humph.
(Tenn.) 425, GRErN, J., says : 1"This
is an action of trespass for breaking and
entering the plaintiff's close. In its
nature it is a local action, the court of
the county in which the laud is situated
alone havingjurisdiction." In Champion
v. Doughty, 3 Harrison (N. J.) 3, the
court says: "This is an action of trespass q. c. f. * * * The action of trespass for breaking a close is a local
action, and must not only be brought in
the county where the land lies, but it
must appear on the record that the trespass was committed in the county."
This was trespass q. c.f., brought in
Atlantic county, the declaration stating
a continuing trespass in that county
from 1832, at which time the county
was not in existence.
In Pefinsylvania the question was

settled in favor of the maintenance of
the rule in Prevost v. Gorrel[, 3 Weekly
Notes 366 (Supreme Court of Penna.),
affirming a decision of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia county
(2 Id. 440). HAaE, P. J., in delivering
the opinion of the court below, said :"The declaration in this case avers
that 'the plaintiff before and at the
time of committing the grievances thereinafter mentioned was and still is possessed of certain mines of coal, situate
in the county of Columbia, to wit: at
the county of Philadelphia aforesaid;
and that the defendant is possessed of
certain lands and mines of coal adjoining the plaintiff's colliery;' and then
goes on to aver that the defendant I hath,
by his wrongful acts and omissions in
and upon the premises so possessed by
him, caused water, filth and rubbish to
flow and enter therefrom in and upon
the plaintiff's premises, whereby the
plaintiff has been greatly damaged and
hindered.' Such a cause of action is
clearly local. It is for an injury to the
plaintiff in his capacity as tenant of
real estate, through acts done by the
defendant on other real estate possessed
by him. This position was conceded
during the argument, but it was contended that the distinction between local
and transitory actions is merely arbitrary
and technical, and should be disregarded
as obsolete.
"It is no doubt true that the motive
for requiring that issues should be tried
in the neighborhood where the controverted facts are alleged to have happened, was that the jurors might he
acquainted with the subject-matter, and
able to correct or supplement the testimony of the witnesses by their own
knowledge; and that a juror is now
regarded as a judge who must draw his
conclusions from the evidence. Hence
an argument that the rule is a relic of
a state of things which has passed away,
and should have no place in our present
system of jurisprudence.
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c A careful consideration may lead
to a different inference. A rule should
not be abrogated because some of the
reasons for it have ceased, if there are
other and sufficient reasons for its con"tinuance. Where the question at issue
is as to the title, boundaries, situation
or condition of real estate, persons who
reside in the neighborhood must necessarily be called as witnesses, and the
cause should obviously be tried at the
place where they can be brought into
court with the least inconvenience to
themselves and cost to the parties. Nor
is this. all. Although the jurors must
render their verdict according to the
evidence, and not from their own knowledge, it is still desirable that they should
have Lgeneral acquaintance with such
matters as are to be laid before them,
and be able to understand the technical
words and terms of art used by the witnesses. Moreover,: the case may be
one that requires a view, and it would
obviously be harsh and impracticable to
take the jufy away from their homes to
inspect piemises.lying in another county,
and perchance at the other end of the
state. It wa kcordingly declared, by
ROGERS, J., iii "Olphantv. Smith, that
' in generil,.whefnever a view may be
necessary, the action-inust be brought in
a county where the injury arises. In
the language of Comyn, it is an action
founded on a local thing and can be the
better tried because the witnesses reside
there, and the alleged nuisance may be
inspected by the jury. It is a local
question because of the defendant's
possession within the body of the
county. The only exception is the
erection of a nuisance in one county to
the injury of lands in another. Then
the action may be brought in either.' "1
In some of the states, however, a different rule prevails. Titus v. Frankfort,
15 Maine 98, was case in Penobscot
county against the inhabitants of Frankfort, in Waldo county, for damages
sustained from defects in a bridge, part

of the highway in Frankfort. "It is
true,"1 said EMERY, J., "that highways
within a town must be local. *** The
neglect of the defendants to do their
duty is of a transitory character, a nonIt constitutes a personal
feasance.
action in delicto, and is transitory. See
Arch. Pleadings 62, 87 ; Co. Litt. 282 ;
I Wilson 336 ; Grimstone v. Molineaux,
Hobart 251 ; Espinasse on Penal Statutes 88."
The distinction between this case and
those of Richardson v. Locklin, 6 B. & S.
775, ante, and Oliphant v. Smith, I Pen.
& Watts 180, must .be sought.for, if it
exist at all, in the difference between
faults of omission and of commission,
a distinction fitter for a schoolman than
a judge.
In Black Y. Black and Hunter, 27
Ga. 47, it was decided that land held
by a partnership was personal property
and the objection on the ground of
locality of action did not therefore prevail. See Rogers v. lVoodbury, 15 Pick.
(Mass.) 157, and Hunt and Wife v.
Town of Pownal, b Verm. 417.
In Ohio the rule has been repudiated
as inapplicable to the conditions of that
state: Genin v. Grier, 10 Ohio 209.
Action by reversionbr against the assignee of a lease of real estate brought
in Monroe county. Plea to the jurisdiction that the premises were situated
in Guernsey county and out of the jurisdiction of the court. The action was
held to be transitory. As this court is
the only one which clearly points out
the inapplicability of the English rule
in the county courts of our states, the
jurisdiction of which to compel an
appearance is usually limited to the
county itself, the opinion is given at
HITCHCOCK, J., said:
some length.
CcAccording to the rules of the English

law the action is local, and cannot be
prosecuted except in the county where
the land lies. * * * From this it appears that the courts of England did not
hesitate to change the rule of law when
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it became necessary to subserve the ends
of justice. In England, no inconvenience results from keeping up the distinction between local and transitory
actions, because, as it is well known,
the appearance of a defendant can as
effectually be compelled in one county
as another. * * * But, if in this state
we were to adhere to the distinction,
there must in many cases be an entire
failure of justice. * * * Whether this
distinction, between local and transitory actions shall be adhered to, must
depend upon our own peculiar system
of jurisprudence. * * * So far as it
respects an action for the recovery of
the possession of real property there can
be no doubt ; such action must be considered as local, and must be tried and
determined in the county where land is
situated. The only action of this description known to our practice is the
action of ejectment. * * * Where then
is the appropriate county? Is it the
county in which the cause of action
accrued ? If so, then there must be a
failure of justice, unless the defendant
happen to be within that county, for
without the service of process the court
cannot take jurisdiction ; and process,
except in some specified cases, cannot
reach beyond the county in which it is
issued. If the action be to recover
damages for a trespass upon real property, is the appropriate county the one
in which the land trespassed upon lies?
If so, the trespasser has nothing to do
but to pass over a county line, and he
escapes with impunity. And so with
respect to an action like the one now
before the court. If it be held to be
local, the assignee of a term entirely
exonerates himself from the payment
of rent by fleeing or removing into another county. In all cases under our
system it would seem, where the action
is personal and for the recovery of a
debt or damages merely, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute, the
appropriate county in which to exercise
VOL. XXV.-47

jurisdiction is the county in which a
defendant may be found, so thatprocess
can be served on him. It is not material that ie should be a resident of the
particular county; it is sufficient if he be
found in it, so that the process can be
legally served. By such service the
court from which the process was issued
obtains jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant, and having jurisdiction of
the subject-matter of the controversy
can proceed with the case. ** * Considering all the legislation of the state
upon this subject of jurisdiction, we
entertain the opinion that it is the person of the defendant which gives a court
jurisdiction in a particular case, so far
as locality is concerned, and as a defendant cannot be compelled to answer
in any other county, except the one
in which he is served with process, except in some few specified cases, he
must be held to answer there, provided
the action be personal and sounds
merely in debt or damages ; and that
such actions must in this state be considered transitory. We are aware that
such decision is an innovation upon the
subject. ** * It is necessary for the
ends of justice, and-no serious inconvenience can result from it."
An interesting case was recently decided by the Court of Appeals in England: The M. Moxham, 1 P. D. 43 ;
reversed on appeal: Id. 107. The
suit was begun by the plaintiff, an
English company, against an English
ship for negligently injuring a pier in a
port of Spain, which pier was the
plaintiff's property. It was held that
the law of Spain (which held the master
and mariners, and not the owners, liable
in such a case) governed the case.
"Very grave difficulties," says JAzEs,
L. J., "might have arisen as to the
jurisdiction of this court to entertain
any'action or proceedings whatever with
respect to injury done to foreign soil.
But the question of jurisdiction has
probably been successfully got over by

